Abstract: The US securities crowdfunding market opened on May 16th, 2016. I provide the first description of the companies and investors participating in this market using data on the full universe of Regulation Crowdfunding issues. I then demonstrate that investment in an issue is closely tied to economic fundamentals after the first week. This result is consistent with unsophisticated investors arriving in the first week and investing indiscriminately and relatively more sophisticated investors arriving thereafter. Based on this evidence, I conclude that the market provides a promising new way for high quality early stage companies to seek financing.
Rift through establishing a more robust market (that goes beyond simple pre-selling) for very early access to investors.
That said, US securities crowdfunding 1 still faces the same substantial information asymmetry and moral hazard challenges that restrict existing financing channels. There are good reasons to expect that the securities crowdfunding market will unravel and fail to attract any investors beyond family, friends, and fools who might have invested in these early stage companies under other terms. 2 Put another way, securities crowdfunding will provide a viable new funding source for early stage companies only if high quality issuers can consistently attract relatively sophisticated outside investors.
I make progress addressing the success of the US securities crowdfunding market in its initial six months of operation in two ways. First, I document the companies and investors participating in the market using new datasets on the full universe of issues under Regulation Crowdfunding.
Second, I demonstrate that investors in the market invest more in issuers with more assets and less long term debt who submit more information to the SEC. Together with the continued growth of the market and investors' self-descriptions as sophisticated agents, this result is consistent with the market successfully attracting relatively sophisticated investors who invest optimally given the limited information available.
Substantial differences in investor sophistication over time lend credence to interpreting the above results as evidence that the market attracts more than family, friends, and fools. I find that investors arriving in the first week do not invest more in issuers with better balance sheets who submit more information to the SEC and that investors arriving by the end of the first month do.
This finding suggests that family, friends, and fools constitute the majority of investors in the first week and that relatively more sophisticated investors arrive thereafter. That investors in the first week are family, friends, and fools is confirmed by anecdotal evidence. Several portals specifically advise issuers to "activate your crowd" and get "family, friends, and fans" to invest by day seven. 3 I conclude that high quality issuers who have otherwise limited access to financing (due to short operating history, business category outside the current VC focus, etc.) can and should consider 1 Often also referred to as equity crowdfunding 2 Family, friends, and fools can provide loans at their discretion. A company can also issue securities to both accredited and unaccredited family and friends under Regulation D rules 506 or 504. These issues are notably restricted to preexisting contacts through a strict ban on advertising or widespread communication of the issue 3 See, for example, the language in Wefunder's launch guide at link turning to securities crowdfunding. Far from unraveling, the market is, so far, robust. I expect the market to continue to grow in the foreseeable future.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 details the current market structure, Section 4 sketches a model motivating a set of credible issuer quality signals that optimizing investors should respond to, Section 5 presents the securities crowdfunding data, Section 6 contains the results of the analysis, and Section 7 concludes. All tables and figures are in the respective appendices.
Related Literature
My work extends the literature on financing decisions of early stage companies. At a high level, there is consensus that early stage companies struggle to secure financing and that banking frictions are a main problem. Venture capital is part of the solution for some companies, but venture capital does not tend to reach very early stage companies and is expensive. Work on rewardsbased crowdfunding suggests that, though available very early, this market inefficiently funds both high and low quality companies. Initial theoretical work suggests securities crowdfunding could efficiently fund very early stage companies, but there is limited empirical evidence on whether the market will succeed.
Berger and Udell (1998) provide a helpful taxonomy of financing options used by companies at different stages of development and document that early stage companies have limited access to external financing. Robb and Robinson (2014) Recent research suggests that early stage companies have an increasingly hard time securing bank loans. Mills and McCarthy (2014) note that despite bank loans to large businesses rising 4%
over 2009-2014, lending to small businesses fell 20% during the same period. Mills and McCarthy identify bank consolidation as a major cause. Large banks using standardized quantitative criteria to assess loan applications are less likely to make loans to small businesses than smaller, more local banks who can better utilize relationship and qualitative information. Other important frictions include the fact that transaction costs incentivize banks to focus on larger loans and that stricter bank capitalization requirements and bank examiner assessments in the wake of the financial crisis put pressure on banks to shed their small loan portfolios.
There is potential for the venture capital market to fill some of this financing void. Gompers and Lerner (2001) overview the growth of the VC market and its role in financing early stage companies. That said, the VC market is characterized by large investments in few companies. VCs invested roughly $24 billion in early stage companies in 2014, but did so through only 2,800 deals according to PitchBook. For comparison, over 27,000 startups are registered in just Silicon Valley on the popular angel investing site AngelList.com.
Put another way, the venture capital market works well to the extent that VCs can take significant equity stakes and then add value through active management. As such, VCs spend significant resources screening companies and negotiating investment terms. These salient features have been extensively explored in the finance literature. Lerner (1994) and Sørensen (2007) provide evidence that VCs can add value through activities including timing the IPO market, monitoring, and general management. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) analyze around 200 contracts between VCs and early stage companies and show that VCs seek rights that match proposed theoretical solutions to classic principal-agent problems.
By construction, as described below, the US securities crowdfunding market is instead targeted to earlier, smaller investments. As such, the closest existing financing source is rewards-based crowdfunding. Rewards-based crowdfunding became a mainstream funding channel with the launch of SellaBand, a platform for artists to raise money from their fans, in 2006. The market is now
represented by websites such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo and features entrepreneurs pre-selling a new consumer product or piece of media to be developed and then sold commercially at a later date.
Research on rewards-based crowdfunding suggests that the market is characterized by family, friends, and fools "gift-giving" to entrepreneurs. Cordova et al. (2015) consider technology projects launched on Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and two other sites, and find that investors back projects without regard to the technical merits of the project. Frydrych et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion using data from just Kickstarter. Gerber et al. (2012) interview supporters of projects on Kickstarter and conclude that feelings of connectedness and community drive their contributions.
That rewards-based crowdfunding is driven by foolish money is perhaps epitomized by Zack Brown's success in raising $55,000 from over 6,900 backers on Kickstarter to make a bowl of potato salad.
In contrast, initial theoretical work suggests that securities crowdfunding could provide an efficient market for financing early stage companies. Strausz (2016) illustrates how securities crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to reduce their demand uncertainty, but that potential gains here are traded off against costs associated with solving the moral hazard problem. Brown and Davies (2016) provide a model of securities crowdfunding when both unsophisticated and sophisticated investors are present. They show that efficient financing occurs for a wide range of project sizes as sophisticated agents are able to learn from the actions of unsophisticated agents and invest only in high quality projects.
Still it is far from obvious that a securities crowdfunding market in practice would not unravel in the face of severe information asymmetry and moral hazard challenges. Empirical work to date has been extremely limited as the first securities crowdfunding portal for unaccredited investors, Seedrs, only opened in the UK in 2012. So far, the literature's focus has been on the effectiveness of entrepreneur signals. Ahlers et al. (2015) use data from the Australian Small Scale Offerings Board (ASSOB) and find that investors invest more in companies whose founders retain more equity and provide more detailed information about company risks. Vismara (2016) conduct a similar exercise using a sample of 271 projects listed on two UK portals, Crowdcube and Seedrs, and find that the entrepreneur's social capital is also important.
Background on US Securities Crowdfunding
The idea of securities crowdfunding took hold in the US following the collapse of the IPO market after the 2008 recession. In an influential series of articles and congressional testimony, David
Weild, a former Vice Chairman of NASDAQ, argued that increased regulatory requirements and the decline of buy-and-hold investing caused this collapse by reducing the return to going public. See, for example, Weild and Kim (2010 
Regulation Crowdfunding
The investment community is excited about Reg CF for two specific reasons. First, it allows unaccredited investors to invest in companies through easy online interfaces. All investors can invest at least $2,000 a year with the cap growing with investor income. See Table 1 Figure 15 in the online appendix for a representative issue page.
In addition to serving as the financial intermediary, portals have several fiduciary duties with respect to the unaccredited investors. Portals must take steps to ensure that the issuers comply with Reg CF, have a system for recording securities holders, and do not intend to defraud investors.
Portals must also work to check that investors comply with investment limitations and provide a channel for companies and investors to publicly discuss the offering on the platform. Portals are not allowed to have a financial interest in a company apart from compensation for their intermediary services and must disclose any compensation they expect to receive. Finally, portals are prohibited from offering investment advice, soliciting purchases, or compensating promoters for solicitations.
Companies
As of November 12th, 2016, 141 companies have started or concluded securities issues under Regulation Crowdfunding. These companies represent a diverse set of industries ranging from consumer products to healthcare. Issuers include:
• Haint Blue Brewing Company, "The only craft microbrewery in Mobile, Alabama"
• Evelo, "Smart electric bikes, sold direct to the consumer"
• Sondors Electric Car, "Most attractive, affordable electric car ever"
• Whim, "A dating app that sets you up on actual dates"
• Vetpronto, "On-demand, house call veterinarians"
Alcoholic beverage companies are particularly well-represented with over 10 breweries and dis- Beyond choosing a type of security to issue and a portal to issue through-multihoming is prohibited-companies must also choose a minimum offering amount and deadline date. The minimum offering amount is restricted to be under the maximum of $1 million and the deadline date is restricted to be greater than 21 days after the start of the issue. The minimum offering amount and deadline date are important values because securities crowdfunding operates under an all-ornothing principle. Investments in an issue are put in escrow and are not released to the company unless the sum is greater than the minimum offering amount by the deadline date. Interestingly, companies are allowed to change both the minimum offering amount and deadline date over the course of the issue subject to SEC approval. However, the potential for abuse is limited as portals are required to notify investors of such changes and investors are allowed to cancel their investments at any point up to 48 hours before the deadline. In practice, many issuers do change either their minimum offering amount or deadline date at least once. Finally, if the issue is over-subscribed, then securities are allocated at the discretion of the issuer. In practice, issuers usually pre-specify that they will allocate on a first-come first-served basis.
Model of Security Issuance
Securities crowdfunding faces classic problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard. Investors may not be able to screen for high quality issuers, nor incentivize them to work after the issue. As such, a priori, there are good reasons to expect the market to unravel and fail to attract investors other than family, friends, and fools.
Economic theory suggests several ways for high quality issuers to mitigate information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. A unified model of a securities crowdfunding issue is beyond the scope of this paper and is a promising avenue for future theoretical work. For now, I consider a basic asymmetric information model of security issuance to fix ideas. Other models, including Myers and Majluf (1984) and the principle-agent moral hazard models in Tirole (2006) , suggest similar conclusions.
Following DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) , assume that an entrepreneur has already invested I in a project and needs cash immediately to meet some outside expenses (and so discounts future payoffs at δ < 1 relative to cash in hand). Also assume that the project will produce a random payoff, π, tomorrow that is independent of the entrepreneur's effort and that the entrepreneur has a private signal, Z, on this next-period payoff.
The entrepreneur can raise money now by selling a fraction q of a security B that she writes on the project's payoff (respecting limited liability constraints) to risk neutral, competitive investors for price P (q). The interest rate is taken to be negligible. Assuming that investors have a lower bound expectation on the payoff based on information,
With some mild additional restrictions, DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) show that the optimal security is debt. Intuitively, debt is relatively insensitive to the entrepreneur's private information.
As such, the entrepreneur is able to sell off more of the right to future positive cashflows through debt than otherwise. DeMarzo and Duffie also demonstrate that a separating equilibrium exists with the price of the security increasing in the investors' lower bound expectation and the entrepreneur's retention of potential future payoff:
It is important to stress here that the securities crowdfunding market is not itself a pricing mechanism. A securities crowdfunding issuer designs and prices a security on its company and then offers this security for sale as is. Of course, any limited liability security is a good bargain at some price. To apply DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), I assume that entrepreneurs generally attempt to "put lipstick on the pig," and so many securities on closer inspection will not warrant their price.
With that qualification, the DeMarzo and Duffie model suggests that if the securities crowdfunding market consists of optimizing investors, then companies issuing debt, with high retention, and positive information, Z o , should receive more investment. That is, investors should prefer to invest in debt issues over equity and convertibles issues as the latter may reflect market inefficiencies and so be less likely to support their valuation. Similarly, investors should be more willing to invest in issues where the entrepreneur retains a lot of the company and where there is good evidence to suggest high lower bound payoffs as these issues are more likely worthy of their stated price. I investigate the extent to which the US securities crowdfunding market is consistent with the assumption of optimizing investors after first documenting the market.
Data
The US securities crowdfunding market opened on May 16th, 2016. I have collected data on the full universe of issues. The main data consists of hourly observations from June 13th through November 12th, 2016 on the progress of each individual issue-capturing the current number of investors, amount invested, and issue details. The data also includes the SEC filings of all issuers, two years of GAAP financial statements for every issuer, all tweets sent by issuers, and self-reported locations and social media accounts of a large sub-sample of investors along with which issues they have invested in.
The data appears to depict a robust market. The US securities crowdfunding market is growing linearly in the number of investors and amount invested, is attracting diverse companies who due to their short operating history would likely struggle to secure traditional financing, and features investors who self-describe as sophisticated. Moreover, simple comparisons of issues that succeeded to those that did not suggest that investors are screening out lemons. I more formally investigate whether investors are more than just family, friends, and fools in Section 6 below.
Market
As of November 12th, 2016, 141 companies have started Regulation Crowdfunding issues across 19 funding portals. 5 companies have already completed a first issue and begun a second issue. 8
These 146 issues have collectively attracted over $13.6 million in funding through 17,000 distinct investments. The average issue has raised $90,000 from 120 investors against a minimum offering amount of $100,000 and still has 37 days to collect the rest. Table 2 provides additional statistics on the aggregate market.
The largest funding portal by any metric is Wefunder. 58 issues have been started on Wefunder that have together attracted $9 million in funding through 13,000 distinct investments. The second largest funding portal is StartEngine with 19 issues that have together attracted $2 million through 1,800 distinct investments. See Table 3 for a breakdown of the issues by funding portal. 9
Given that the US securities crowdfunding market has only existed for half a year, $13.6 million in funding is an impressive figure. The market continues to grow rapidly measured in both the number of investors and the amount invested. The time series in Figure 1 shows that the market is experiencing nearly constant linear growth in both metrics. Correspondingly, there has also been a steady deal flow of around 20 new issues a month. Table   5 provides the number of issues offering each type of security.
Many of the issuers in the US securities crowdfunding market are startlingly young companies.
The median issuer is only 10 months old. Due to lack of operating history alone, most of these companies would likely fail to secure traditional outside financing. 10 At the start of the issue, the median issuer has 3 employees, assets of $26,000, and no debt or revenue. The median issuer is seeking to raise $70,000 and so almost triple its asset base. Of note, several of the companies pursuing issues are already profitable. Additional summary statistics from the financial statements of these issuers are collected in Table 6 .
As the US securities crowdfunding market is still in its infancy, ongoing issues easily outnumber issues that have already closed. A total of 50 issues have closed as of November 12th, 2016. 26 of these closed issues succeeded in meeting their minimum offering amount by their deadline date. 3 of these successful closed issues raised the maximum of $1 million, whereas most raised between $100,000 and $200,000.
Importantly, US securities crowdfunding operates under an all-or-nothing principle. Only issuers who raise more than their minimum offering amount by their deadline date receive the financing.
However, terming an issue successful is somewhat misleading as issuers can (and do) change their minimum offering amount and deadline over the course of the issue subject to SEC approval. The median issuer has made one such amendment. The potential for abuse here is limited though as current investors in the issue are alerted to the change and can withdraw their investments. As such, it is not possible to turn any issue into a "success."
Comparing the attributes of unsuccessful and successful issues already provides some evidence that investors in the US securities crowdfunding market are able to screen out lemons. Issuers 10 Previously, the quickest a typical company has been able to receive financing is through online small business lenders such as OnDeck or Kabbage (opened in 2006 and 2009 respectively) . OnDeck and Kabbage offer $100,000 lines of credit at between 9%-108% APR to businesses that are at least 9 months old with $75,000 of annual revenue (OnDeck) or over 1 year old with $50,000 of annual revenue (Kabbage). Any draws on the line of credit are considered independent loans and must be paid back within 6 or 12 months that failed to receive financing are poorer performing companies along a number of dimensions.
Significant at the 5% level, issuers that failed to receive financing had less cash on hand, filed less information with the SEC at the start of the issue, and had a lower outside expert rating. The point estimates also suggest that the issuers who failed had more debt, fewer assets, and lower revenue. See Table 7 for these comparisons and others.
Market Ecosystem
Despite the recent advent of the US securities crowdfunding market, there is already a substantial market ecosytem. iDisclose helps Reg CF issuers prepare their Form C. Crowdfundinsider.com and Crowdfundinginvestor.com are dedicated to reporting securities crowdfunding industry news. Entrepreneur Magazine and Inc. Magazine each have a crowdfunding section. Crowdability aggregates issues occurring across different funding portals. Stratifund provides outside expert ratings and reports on the vast majority of Reg CF issuers. Finally, Twitter serves as an important platform for these actors and the issuers to share news and announce issues.
Given the severe information asymmetry challenges, Stratifund's role as a ratings agency is particularly important. Stratifund purports to conduct in-depth analysis of each issue, which it summarizes with a star rating on a scale from 1 (bad) to 5 (good). Stratifund gives 0 stars to issuers who appear fraudulent such as Content Launch, a company seeking to raise $100,000 in equity on Flashfunders. Stratifund notes that "[Content Launch] and its CEO are currently being sued by numerous banks for unpaid credit card bills of $300k. Because of this significant risk Stratifund has rated the company as a 0. The rating will be amended once the lawsuit is settled, until then this is a significant red flag investors should strongly consider." Stratifund's star ratings are freely available and potential investors can pay $9 a month to access the detailed reports. The histogram of Stratifund ratings is presented in Figure 2 and is noteably left-tailed (statistically different from normal at the 1% level).
Twitter appears to be a main advertising channel for US securities crowdfunding issuers. Twitter is an obvious advertising choice because Reg CF requires that issues be conducted online and restricts advertising to just the announcement that the issue is occurring Table 8 . On inspection, tweets over the course of the issue are a mix of regular business advertisements along with specific references and links to the Reg CF issue. I hope to explore the impact of advertising on the success of issues in later work.
Specific Issues
Examining the hourly data on the number of investors and amount invested in each issue sheds important light on how issues unfold over time. Issues typically last four months and start with a rapid influx of investors and investments that is perhaps driven by family and friends. For a representative example, see the surge in investments at the beginning of Mobodexter's, "Backend software platform makes it easy to launch any IoT company," ongoing issue depicted in Figure 3 .
The arrival rate of additional investors and investments often slows after the first week. Sometimes this middle period of the issue is broken by a few periods of rapid progress that may be attributable to advertising. The ongoing issue of Sondors Electric Car in Figure 4 displays an unusually large number of such surges. Finally, several issues end with another rapid influx of investors and investments possibly because portals tend to heavily promote concluding issues through page placement and emails to registered users. The last week of the closed issue of Hops and Grain, "Gold Medal winning craft brewery in Austin, Texas," in Figure 5 is a good illustration. That these dynamics are rather general can be seen in Figures 16 and 17 in the online appendix, which respectively display the number of investors and amount invested in each issue over time.
In a handful of cases, it appears that issuers make an attempt to "save" an issue that has currently attracted little investment-again issuers need to raise more than their minimum offering amount by their deadline date in order to receive any financing. An issuer might try to increase the likelihood of success through lowering its minimum offering amount or extending its deadline date.
For example, Farm from a Box, "Complete off-grid toolkit for tech-powered agriculture," original sought to issue at least $465,000 by September 19th, 2016 on Republic, but as of November 12th was trying to issue at least $100,000 by December 16th, 2016. Alternatively, sometimes issues manage to ensure success through what seem to be "pre-arranged" investments. See the ongoing issue of Green Sense Farms, "Transforming farming and disrupting produce distribution," in Figure 6 , wherein the issuer met its minimum offering amount through a comparatively massive investment of $100,000 on the first day.
The high frequency of the data also provides some insight into the individual transactions. Two thirds of hours of issues that saw any investment had only a single investment. As such, by and large, the individual investments are identified in the data. Surprisingly, there is a large amount of dispersion in the identified individual investments and large portal fixed effects. The average investor on Republic (notably a "social cause"-themed portal) invested only $400, whereas the average investor on Wefunder invested $900. The standard deviation of investments on Republic is $1,300, whereas the standard deviation of investments on Wefunder is over $3,000. See Table 9 for summary statistics on the identified individual investments across all portals.
Investors
There is a wealth of data on who exactly is investing in the US securities crowdfunding market.
Importantly, these investors do not appear to be just family, friends, and fools. From the same data it is possible to discern part of the investor network. While most investors only invest in a single issue, a handful of investors invest in up to eight issues. In the visualization of the network in Figure 12 investors (nodes) are connected with an edge whenever they co-invest in the same issue. That there is little co-investment can be seen from the fact that the separate issues appear as distinct clouds of red points. The handful of connecting investors show up as lone red dots. It will be interesting to track whether co-investment increases over time. In particular, I hope to examine the extent to which investors follow each other into issues and their motivation for doing so.
The data detailed above depict a growing market, attracting very early stage companies and fairly sophisticated investors from around the world. The data appears to suggest that investors are more than just family, friends, and fools. I now turn to regressions that demonstrate that, after the first week, investors invest more in issuers with more assets and less debt who submit more information to the SEC. This result is consistent with family, friends, and fools arriving in the first week and investing indiscriminately and relatively more sophisticated investors arriving after and driving the outcome of the issue.
Results
At issue is whether US securities crowdfunding provides a new source of funding for very early stage companies. The answer is far from apparent as the market could certainly unravel in face of severe asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. Despite these challenges, examining the universe of closed issues, I show that investors invest more in issuers with stronger balance sheets who provide more information to the SEC. This result is consistent with the market attracting optimizing investors who find and invest more in higher quality issuers.
Lending credence to this interpretation is a stark difference in apparent sophistication between investors in the first week and the first month. I demonstrate that total investment by the end of the first week is not explained by issuer balance sheets nor information submitted to the SEC and that investment by the end of the first month is. This result is consistent with family, friends, and fools constituting the majority of investors in the first week, and relatively more sophisticated investors arriving thereafter. That early investors are family, friends, and fools is confirmed by anecdotal evidence. Several portals specifically advise issuers to "activate your crowd" and get "family, friends, and fans" to invest by day seven.
Closed Issues
I examine whether investors invest more in issuers who are issuing debt, who have stronger balance sheets and higher outside ratings, and who submit more information to the SEC using the 50 Regulation Crowdfunding issues that have closed as of November 12th, 2016. 12 Broadly speaking, I find evidence affirming that this is the case. Controlling for the scale of the issue, investors invest more in companies with more assets, less long term debt who have higher Stratifund ratings and who submit more information to the SEC. Tables 12, 13, and 14 build this conclusion through short regressions, and Table 15 presents the long regression. All regression tables display dollar values in thousands, White standard errors, and adjusted R 2 s.
To understand whether investors discriminate between issues by security type offered, Table 12 considers short regressions of the amount invested (Column 1), the amount invested scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors (Column 3) on fixed effects for the type of security offered and the original minimum offering amount. That is, the specification in Column 1 is:
Here equity groups common and preferred stock and the omitted category consists of SAFEs, a convertible note, and LLC membership units.
Interestingly, Table 12 provides no evidence of investor preference for different securities. The point estimates suggest that investors invest more in debt than SAFEs and LLC membership units than equity. The point estimates also suggest that equity issues attract the most investors though this result is driven by the highly successful issue of Legion M. Still, none of these differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.
To understand whether investors discriminate between issues by balance sheet metrics, Table   13 considers short regressions of the amount invested (Column 1), the amount invested scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors (Column 3) on the issuer's assets, cash, short term debt, long term debt, revenue, and debt to asset ratio in the most recent (and often only) fiscal year along with the original minimum offering amount. The specifications are of the form:
Across all three outcomes considered, I find that investors invest more in issuers with more assets (and specifically more cash) and less in companies with more long term debt. As seen in Column 1, a $1,000 increase in the issuer's assets is associated with $170 in additional investments, a $1,000 increase in cash is associated with $760 in additional investments, and a $1,000 increase in long term debt is associated with a $180 decrease in investments. Alternatively, as seen across Columns 2 and 3, a $100,000 increase in issuer assets is associated with the issue raising an additional 32% of its original minimum offering amount and receiving 28 additional investors. Meanwhile, a $100,000 increase in long term debt is associated with the issue raising 29% less of its original minimum offering amount and receiving 36 fewer investors. Overall, there is strong evidence that investors invest based on issuer balance sheets. Balance sheet variables alone explain a notable 30% of the variance in amount invested.
Finally, to understand whether investors discriminate between issues based on the amount and quality of information released, Table 14 considers the same short regressions on the amount of information the issuer filed with the SEC in megabytes, the Stratifund rating of the issuer, a dummy for no Stratifund rating, and the original minimum offering amount.
These regressions suggest that investors invest more in issuers who offer more and higher quality information. As seen in Column 1, a 1 megabyte increase in the amount of information filed with the SEC is associated with receiving $3,300 in additional investments. Similarly, a 1 star increase in the issuer's Stratifund rating is associated with receiving $49,000 in additional investments. These results largely hold for the other outcomes considered. In particular, a 1 megabyte increase in the amount of information filed with the SEC is associated with raising an additional 5.8% against the original minimum offering amount and securing an additional 3 investors.
Together, the short regressions provide substantial evidence that investors distinguish between issues based on issuers' balance sheets and information released. This conclusion is affirmed in the long regressions in Table 15 . Specifically, Table 15 considers long regressions of the amount invested (Column 1), the amount invested scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors (Column 3) on security type fixed effects; issuer assets and long term debt in the most fiscal recent year; the amount of information the issuer filed with the SEC in megabytes;
the Stratifund rating of the issuer, a dummy for no Stratifund rating, and the original minimum offering amount. The main specification is:
As seen in Column 1, the results from the short regressions are largely confirmed. A $1,000 increase in issuer assets is associated with $125 in additional investments, a $1,000 increase in long term debt is associated with a $154 decrease in investments, and a 1 megabyte increase in the amount of information submitted to the SEC is associated with $3,000 in additional investments.
Similarly, as seen across Columns 2 and 3, a $100,000 increase in issuer assets is associated with the issue raising an additional 25% of its original offering amount and receiving an additional 15 investors, whereas a $100,000 increase in long term debt is associated with the issue raising 25% less of its original minimum offering amount and receiving 21 fewer investors.
Investors in First Week vs First Month
That at least some investors are relatively sophisticated is further supported by substantial heterogeneity in how investors assess issuers over time. I document below that investors in the first week do not invest more in issuers with stronger balance sheets who submit more information to the SEC. Several portals specifically advise issuers to "activate your crowd" and get "family, friends, and fans" to invest by day seven. As such, I conclude that the majority of investors in the first week consist of family, friends, and fools. After the first week, relatively more sophisticated investors arrive. Already by the end of the first month, their more discriminating money dominates.
I conclude that the US securities crowdfunding market attracts a substantial number of relatively more sophisticated investors after the first week. 
I estimate these long regressions on the universe of 71 issuers to whom I can associate the 13 Stratifund posts a rating for most issuers within the first three business days of their filing number of investors and amount invested seven days after the issuer filed its Form C with the SEC. 14 Of note, an issue is typically listed on its chosen funding portal the day after filing Form C. From the population of 146 Reg CF issues, I lose 52 issues due to delays in setting up recording of the various portals, 2 issues who filed less than a week before November 12th, and 21 issues because the computer program collecting data from the portals did not complete its run on the seventh day 15 As a result, the sample is selected towards issues that occurred over a month after the opening of the portal hosting the issue. If anything, I expect this selection to bias my results against finding that early investors are family, friends, and fools because the excitement of being one of the first ever US securities crowdfunding investors probably drew in a lot of foolish money in the first weeks of the market.
The results in Table 16 suggest that investors in the first week do not discriminate much between issuers. Looking across Columns 1, 2, and 3, there is no evidence that investors invest more in debt issues than issues of SAFEs and LLC units. There is also no evidence that investors invest more in issuers with higher assets nor in issuers with less debt. For example, a $1,000 increase in the issuer's assets is associated with only $15 of additional investment, which is economically and statistically insignificant. There is some evidence that investors do invest more in issuers who submit more information to the SEC. As seen in Column 3, a 1 megabyte increase in information submitted to the SEC is associated with receiving 1 additional investor. Still, tellingly, only 15% of the variance in the amount invested by the end of the first week is attributable to these variables, whereas they explain 35% of the variance in the amount invested by the end of the issue. Investments made in the first week appear to be largely blind to fundamentals.
It must then be the case that the discriminating money arrives after the first week. This is certainly possible as the majority of investment occurs after the first week. The average issuer has only raised $27,000 by day seven and will go on to raise over $150,000 by the end of the issue. I now show that the data suggest that relatively sophisticated investors arrive even before the close of the first month, whereat the average issuer has raised $55,000, and that their investments by then already dominate those of the family, friends, and fools from the first week. By the end of the first month, investments reflect substantially the same assessments of the issuer as total investments at 14 The results at days five and nine are broadly similar 15 These last losses are concentrated in September when I was only able to run the collection program sporadically the conclusion of the issue. Table 17 presents the results of re-estimating the long regressions from above on the universe of 93 issuers to whom I can associate the number of investors and amount invested thirty days after the issuer filed its Form C with the SEC. 16 From the population of 146 Reg CF issues, I lose 22 issues due to delays in setting up recording of the various portals, 14 issues who filed less than a month before November 12th, and 17 issues because the computer program collecting data from the portals did not complete its run on the thirtieth day.
In sharp contrast to investors arriving by the end of the first week, I find that investors arriving by the end of the month invest more in issuers with more assets, less long term debt, who submit more information to the SEC and who have a higher Stratifund rating. As seen in Column 1 of Table 17 , a $1,000 increase in issuer assets is associated with $24 in additional investments, a $1,000 increase in long term debt is associated with a $50 decrease in investments, and a 1 megabyte increase in the amount of information submitted to the SEC is associated with $1,500 in additional investments. Alternatively, as seen across Columns 2 and 3, a $100,000 increase in issuer assets is associated with the issue raising an additional 5% of its original minimum offering amount and receiving 4 additional investors, whereas a $100,000 increase in issuer long term debt is associated with the issue raising 8% less against its original minimum offering amount and receiving 7 fewer investors. From these results, I conclude that the US securities crowdfunding market attracts relatively sophisticated investors to issues even within the first month of the issue.
Conclusion
The US securities crowdfunding market opened on May 16th, 2016. Operating under Regulation
Crowdfunding, the enactment of Title III of the 2012 JOBS Act, the market allows unaccredited investors to purchase securities issued by private companies for the first time. 17 The stated goal of the market is to provide a novel financing source for early stage US companies. However, it is far from obvious that the market will succeed. To do so, it will need to overcome severe information asymmetry and moral hazard challenges. The market may unravel and fail to attract anyone other 16 The results at days twenty eight and thirty two are broadly similar 17 With the exception that unaccredited family and friends could previously invest in a private company issuing under Regulation D with some restrictions than family, friends, and fools.
I show that, now six months in, the US securities crowdfunding market is providing a viable new funding channel for early stage companies. The data detailed above depict a growing market, attracting very early stage companies and self-described sophisticated investors from around the world. The data also reveals that, after the first week, investors invest more in issuers with more assets and less debt who submit more information to the SEC. This result is consistent with family, friends, and fools arriving in the first week and investing indiscriminately and relatively more sophisticated investors arriving after and driving the outcome of the issue. Table 13 : Linear regressions of the amount invested (Column 1), the amount invested scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors (Column 3) on the issuer's assets, cash, short term debt, long term debt, revenue, and debt to asset ratio in the most recent fiscal year along with the original minimum offering amount fit on the universe of 50 Regulation Crowdfunding issues closed by November 12th, 2016 Table 14 : Linear regressions of the amount invested (Column 1), the amount invested scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors (Column 3) on the amount of information the issuer filed with the SEC in megabytes, the Stratifund rating of the issuer, a dummy for no Stratifund rating, and the original minimum offering amount fit on the universe of 50 Regulation Crowdfunding issues closed by November 12th, 2016 Table 15 : Linear regressions of the amount invested (Column 1), the amount invested scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors (Column 3) on security type fixed effects; issuer assets and long term debt in the most fiscal recent year; the amount of information filed with the SEC in megabytes; the Stratifund rating of the issuer, a dummy for no Stratifund rating, and the original minimum offering amount fit on the universe of 50 Regulation Crowdfunding issues closed by November 12th, 2016 Table 16 : Linear regressions of the amount invested by day 7 (Column 1), the amount invested by day 7 scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors by day 7 (Column 3) on security type fixed effects; issuer assets and long term debt in the most fiscal recent year; the amount of information filed with the SEC in megabytes; the Stratifund rating of the issuer, a dummy for no Stratifund rating, and the original minimum offering amount fit on the universe of 71 Regulation Crowdfunding issues to which I can associate the status of the issue on the 7th day after the issuer filed its Form C with the SEC Table 17 : Linear regressions of the amount invested by day 30 (Column 1), the amount invested by day 30 scaled by the original minimum offering amount (Column 2), and the number of investors by day 30 (Column 3) on security type fixed effects; issuer assets and long term debt in the most fiscal recent year; the amount of information filed with the SEC in megabytes; the Stratifund rating of the issuer, a dummy for no Stratifund rating, and the original minimum offering amount fit on the universe of 93 Regulation Crowdfunding issues to which I can associate the status of the issue on the 30th day after the issuer filed its Form C with the SEC C Online Appendix Figure 13 : Wefunder is the largest securities crowdfunding portal by the number of issues conducted, number of investors, and amount invested. Wefunder's landing page displays a banner that cycles through different reasons investors should invest in securities crowdfunding issues, links to all the current issues on the site, and links to successful past issues (not visible in the screenshot below) Figure 14 : uFundingPortal is the smallest equity crowdfunding portal with the least developed user interface. The majority of issuers here appear to have outstanding legal issues or are newly incorporated. uFundingPortal was delisted as an authorized funding portal on November 9th, 2016
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Figure 15: Each issue is given a dedicated page on its funding portal. This page displays the issuer's "story," the current status of the issue, the security being issued, and details on the issuer's financials, growth, and officers (not visible in the screenshot below) 
